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FIRST AMENDMENT POSTCARDS FROM
THE EDGE OF CYBERSPACE
FLOYD ABRAMS*
It is very nice to be here and to participate in this fascinating
day. I cannot think of a topic that would have drawn so many
people from so many different disciplines, all trying to divine the
future direction of the law in so new an area.
I want to start with a disclaimer that will be unnecessary for
those of you here who know me: I have yet to surf the 'Net. Ever.
I am not a techie. Not at all. From my office in downtown New
York, the Internet community sometimes seems like what one
scholar called frontiers people,1 which I also do not quite think of
myself as being.
It all reminds me of a day when I was in law school some years
ago. We had a professor, Fritz Kessler,2 with a marvelous, almost
theatrical German accent. He was German born, German edu-
cated, and German accented, with American law school savvy. He
called one of my classmates to present a case. The student ex-
plained, "I'm sorry, Professor, I haven't read the case." Professor
* B.A., Cornell University, 1956; LL.B. Yale Law School, 1960. Mr. Abrams is a partner
in the New York City firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel. He was Chairman of the Communi-
cations Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and is the William
J. Brennan, Jr. Visiting Professor of Law and Journalism at the Columbia Graduate School
of Journalism.
Previously, Mr. Abrams served as Chairman of Mayor Edward Koch's Committee on Ap-
pointments, Chairman of the New.York State Zenger Commemoration Planning Commit-
tee, Chairman of the Committee on Freedom of Speech and of the Press of the Individual
Rights Section of the American Bar Association, and Chairman of the Committee on Free-
dom of Expression of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association.
Mr. Abrams has argued frequently before the United States Supreme Court in cases in-
volving freedom of the press. He was co-counsel to the New York Times in the Pentagon
Papers case and has represented various networks, journalists, and media.
Mr. Abrams thanks Landis C. Best, an associate at Cahill Gordon & Reindel, for her
assistance in preparing this speech.
1 See, e.g., Mike Godwin, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (analogizing burgeoning legal and social ramifications of computer tech-
nology to unexplored prairie frontier).
2 See Ronald K. L. Collins, Gilmore's Grant (Or the Life & Afterlife of Grant Gilmore &
His Death), 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 7, 11 (1995) (explaining Professor Kessler's role in develop-
ment of American contract law); see also Anthony T. Kronman, My Senior Partner, 104
YALE L.J. 2129, 2129-31 (1995) (paying tribute to Professor Kessler).
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Kessler replied, "Ah, from you vee get zee fresh approach." There
the student stood for an hour with Professor Kessler, who was de-
lighted to hear the facts, the holding, the law, and then to pillory
the student in front of us all. I know those things do not happen
any more in law school.
Let me start with what may seem like an anomaly, but it seems
to me something we should consider as we think about the In-
ternet and the law. The question I raise is: Whose law, or what
law? I mean to raise it not so much on a legalistic level-who has
the right to impose law-but on an intensely practical one. Which
country's law will affect what is carried, or what is not carried, on
the Internet?
Let me start with a non-cyber example-the Spycatcher cases
which occurred around the world in the late 1980s. These cases
were brought by the United Kingdom to ban publication of the
book, Spycatcher.4 The book was written by Peter Wright, a for-
mer MI5 operative who served for twenty years as a member of
the English Secret Service. 5 Wright did a lot of work on counter-
espionage, particularly on the topic of widespread Soviet penetra-
tion of the Service.6 Upon his retirement, he requested a full-scale
investigation relating to his charges that the Secret Service opera-
tions in England had been used to destabilize the government
under the Labor Prime Minister.7 When Mr. Wright concluded
that there would be an inadequate investigation, he started writ-
ing his book and sought to publish it.'
The British government first went to court in 1985 to enjoin
publication of Spycatcher, citing national security concerns.' It
went to court in Australia where the book was about to be pub-
3 Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 872 (Ch. 1988);
Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd., 3 All E.R. 316 (1987) (Eng.); Attorney-
General v. Newspaper Publishing, 3 All E.R. 276 (1987) (Eng.). See generally ECONOMICAL
WITH THE TRUTH: THE LAW AND THE MEDIA IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, 17-42 (Dimity Kings-
ford-Smith & Dawn Oliver eds., 1990) (discussing Spycatcher litigation and implications
raised concerning freedom of speech).
4 PETER WRIGHT, SPYCATCHER: THE CANDID AuToBIOGRAPIY OF A SENIOR INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER (Viking 1987).
5 Id. at 1.
6 Id. at 1-2, 190-212, 367, 375.
7 Id. at 272-75, 362-65.
8 Id. at 377-82.
9 Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), 2 W.L.R. 805, 815 (Ch. D.
1988).
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lished, and the Attorney General of Australia obtained a restraint
against publication. 10
There was a good deal of reporting in the English and American
press about the book. Then the book was released in the United
States. When it was, it changed the world about the book because
the secrets were out and nothing was left to protect, so that every-
thing the Crown wanted to keep from being said was being said
perfectly freely and in a manner wholly protected by the First
Amendment in the United States.1 ' I submitted an affidavit in
that case on behalf of one of the accused English newspapers,
summarizing American law and pointing out that it would be im-
possible to obtain a prior restraint on publication of the book in
the United States.
Once the book was published in the United States, contrary rul-
ings to what had occurred earlier started to come down around the
world. The English government continued, for its own quixotic
reasons, to try to prevent publication of the book around the
world, although it was freely available in the United States. Con-
sequently, people were able freely to bring the book into the
United Kingdom. 12 1 recall reading about one English person who
brought eighty copies into Heathrow Airport while dressed as Un-
cle Sam and sold them in England. 13 He was arrested, not for im-
porting the book, but for selling books without a vendor's license-
those wily English!
So the book was out, and because it was out in America,
the courts in Australia' 4 and the courts in New Zealand 15 re-
10 Id. at 872.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; ... ." Id.
12 See George Christian, Memoirs of a Spy Hunter/The Book the British Government has
Banned, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 9, 1987, at 14 (discussing international availability of Spy-
catcher and its importation by tourists).
13 Cf Philomena M. Dane, The Spycatcher Cases, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 405, 409 (1989) (dis-
cussing free availability of book to British citizens).
14 See, e.g., Attorney-General (U.K.) v. Heinemann Publ'rs Austrl. Pty. Ltd. (1988) 165
C.L.R. 30 (Austl.) (declining to enforce obligation concerning foreign government's intelli-
gence secrets).
15 See, e.g., Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 2 W.L.R. 805, 820
(Ch. D. 1988) (dismissing injunction against newspaper and refusing to grant temporary
restraining order pending appeal of decision), affd Attorney-General v. Wellington News-
papers Ltd. (unreported), Apr. 28, 1988 (noted in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspa-
pers Ltd. (No. 2) 3 W.L.R. 776, 790 (H.L.(E) 1988)); Dane supra, note 13, at 409.
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jected British attempts to get a prior restraint against the
book. 16
It seemed to me at the time that the message from the incident
was that the country with the greater amount of legal freedom
was likely to triumph over those with more restrictive laws. That
is to say, if something could be published in the United States and
was published in the United States, what was the point of ban-
ning it in any democratic country elsewhere in the world? It
seemed to me that so long as our broad level of First Amendment
freedoms persisted, it would become increasingly difficult to ban
publication in advance, and maybe altogether, in other coun-
tries-at least those that were unwilling to be wholly repressive.
This scenario was happening more and more, in many different
ways.
I was in Malaysia once to give a talk to a law school class about
American First Amendment law. The questions coming from the
students of a country which banned Salman Rushdie's book, The
Satanic Verses 7 , were "What are we missing? Is the book good?
Did you read the book? Did you like the book?" I asked, "Where
did you all learn about this book that is banned here?" And they
replied, "CNN."
I again came to a similar conclusion. How can a country, not
willing to become a really repressive state, ban some books here
and there without becoming a repressive state? How can you do
it? Or to put it differently, does this not mean, I asked myself,
that American First Amendment law was quietly but effectively
sweeping the world? Yet, as I look at the Internet situation
around the world, I start to wonder if we may see just the opposite
situation developing.
Consider the case you have read about and perhaps heard about
this morning, in which an Attorney General in Bavaria, Germany
commenced proceedings against Prodigy for posting antisemitic
material which is protected under the First Amendment here, but
which is criminal in Germany. 8 The result, at least for a time,
16 On British (ultimately unsuccessful) attempts to ban the publication of excerpts of
Spycatcher in newspapers in England and other countries, see generally Dane, supra, note
13.
17 SALMm RusHim, TIM SATANIC VERSES (1989).
18 See, e.g., AOL Added to German Probe of Racism on Internet, L.A. TIMas, Feb. 3, 1996,
at 2 (discussing German prosecution of antisemitic material on Internet).
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was that Prodigy stopped carrying the material, or tried to stop
carrying the material here, so as not to be in trouble with German
law. 19
That is something that seems to be a risk, perhaps a reality, in
situations where the technology that we are talking about is such
that the same material appears in the United States at the same
time as it appears everywhere else in the world. This is the oppo-
site lesson from the one I thought we were learning from the Spy-
catcher cases. It is one that varies depending on the nature of the
technology itself.
The New York Times is not published abroad; the Paris edition
of the Herald Tribune is. One of the things that the Herald Trib-
une does differently is to read the stories in the New York Times
for libel under English, French, and-alas--Singapore libel
laws.2 °
What if you cannot check the material because of the differences
in technology, because once something is up and out there, it is
everywhere? The result could be a situation where countries that
afford less protection are the ones that really rule in terms of what
is ultimately posted or carried at all by other forms of media.
That, at least, is the risk.
I have seen this occur in some cases I have worked on involving
American television which broadcasts into Canada. A few people
have brought libel suits in Canada about American television
news broadcasts aimed almost exclusively at the American public,
claiming their reputations were hurt in Canada.21 This has not
happened enough to cause American broadcasters to make many
major changes in what they broadcast. But it does not take much
imagination to conjure up the visage of law suits in Mexico, or
some of the Caribbean Islands, or in Canada-all because we sim-
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., William Glaberson, Paper to Pay $214, 285 in Singapore Libel Case, N.Y.
TnMEs, Nov. 29, 1995, at A10 (discussing International Herald Tribune's decision to settle
libel suit brought against it by former Prime Minister of Singapore for opinion piece about
Singapore judiciary); see also William Glaberson, Newspaper Decides Not to Fight Singa-
pore Libel Award, N.Y. Tmuds, Aug. 6, 1995, at A3 (discussing International Herald Trib-
une's decision not to appeal $678,000 verdict that opinion article about "dynastic politics" in
Singapore violated Singapore libel law); Philip Shenon, Paper Told to Pay $678,00 in Sin-
gapore Suit, N.Y. TnMs, July 27, 1995, at A5 (discussing decision of Singapore Supreme
Court finding article in International Herald Tribune to be libelous of Singapore officials).
21 See, e.g., Amy Dockser, Plaintiffs Take Libel Suits Abroad, To Favorable Laws, WALL
ST. J., June 6, 1989, at §2, p. 1 (discussing defamation lawsuit brought by Bahamian Prime
Minister Lyndon 0. Pindling against NBC in Canada).
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ply do not have the technological means to keep a television image
from going into countries that have different bodies of law.
Think of this situation as applied to the Internet. Consider the
possibility that, absent some greater cohesiveness, at least in the
democratic world community, of what may be published and what
may not, we could have a situation where what Americans come to
read, see, and learn, is determined by less protective laws than
the ones that exist here, because the information that is posted is
available simultaneously.
I was struck by the situation not so long ago when the President
of France was gravely ill and his doctor wrote a book called Le
Grand Secret.22 The secret was that the President had been unfit
to serve for the last five years of his tenure due to the gravity of
his illnesses, which were being treated by this doctor.23 French
authorities responded in the democratic way we see sometimes-
by banning the book one day after publication for breaching medi-
cal confidentiality and privacy laws.24 During the one day that it
was available, at least one person bought it and posted the com-
plete book on the Internet for anyone to read.25 This raises the
question: Given this new forum and the nature of this new means
of communication, can we keep secrets at all anymore?
Twenty-five years ago I was involved in the Pentagon Papers
case,21 where a source of the New York Times made available
twenty-four volumes of a TOP SECRET Defense Department
study of how the United States got involved in the war in Viet-
nam.27 I wonder if that individual wanted to leak such informa-
tion today, if, instead of giving it or making it available to the New
22 CLAUDE GuBLER, LE GRAND SECRET at <http//www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/user/-declan/
www/le-secret>.
23 Id.
24 See Douglas Lavin, Browsing a Tangled Web of Cafes, Scandal, Intrigue, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), May 2, 1996, at 4 (detailing events surrounding January 18th ban of book re-
leased after President Mitterrand's death on January 8th); see also Jana Mikoska, Mitter-
rand Mania keeps French Publishers, Courts Busy, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 25, 1996(5,000 copies out of 40,000 first printing seized by police); cf Bill Gates, Internet Filtering
Requires Delicate Balance, L.A. DAILY NEws, Apr. 1, 1996, at B1 (discussing ramifications
of access to banned publication on Internet).
25 See GUBLER, supra note 22.
26 United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), cause remanded by
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd sub nom. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
27 Id. at 325-27; see also John Cary Sims, Triangulating the Boundaries of the Pentagon
Papers, 2 WM. & MARY BmL OF RTs. J. 341 (1993); Floyd Abrams, The Pentagon Papers a
Decade Later, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1981, at 22. See generally DAvID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY
THE PRESSES STOPPED (1996).
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York Times, it would just be posted on the Internet. There would
be no prior restraint problem and little risk because, so it seems,
there are ways that this can be done to make it extremely difficult
to find out who posted it. This is certainly a far different situation
than that faced by the Times source in 1971.
It is interesting, with this as background, to talk a little bit
about the legislation that has been adopted in this area which af-
fects in one way or another what may and may not appear on this
new communication. I refer to the Communications Decency Act 28
and the Online Family Empowerment Act.29 Both of these provi-
sions relate to a common theme-the expressed desire to protect
children from sexually explicit and other inappropriate material
on-line.3 0
There is no question that the government has a serious interest,
or that the courts would certainly conclude that the government
has a serious interest, in this area.3' There is also no question
that extremely serious First Amendment questions are raised
whenever Congress prevents adults from reading or seeing mate-
rial which they have a constitutional right to read or see, simply
because it is viewed as harmful to children. It does not answer
every such question to repeat Justice Frankfurter's observation of
thirty-nine years ago, that the government may not reduce the
adult population to reading what is fit for children.3 2 But it is a
good start. Whether the Supreme Court will start there is another
question.
In looking at the Online Family Empowerment provision, there
are two important First Amendment concerns regarding the In-
ternet: The first is the potential liability of on-line services for
28 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-502, 110 Stat. 133
(1996).
29 Online Family Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 137 (1996)
(proposed June 10, 1995 as "Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act" by Rep. C.
Christopher Cox (R. Calif.) and Rep. Ron Wyden (D. Ore.) as amendment to Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1995).
30 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 458, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (discussing desire to protect
children through proposed legislation); S. REP. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (set-
ting forth legislative purposes of Telecommunications Act of 1996); H.R. REP. No. 223,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (discussing "V-Chip" and noting goal to "clean up the
Internet").
31 Cf Bill Freza, Fear Mongering: "Just Say No to Cybercrats", COMMUNICATIONS WEEK,
July 22, 1996 (discussing increasing attempts to regulate cyberspace).
32 See Butler v. State of Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.) (reversing
conviction under Michigan obscenity statute and declaring "[the incidence of [that] enact-
ment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children").
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libel;33 the second is the growing concern about the Internet as a
particularly hospitable forum for hate speech.34
The Communications Decency Act contains three separate
prohibitions that raise serious First Amendment issues. First, it
criminalizes the transmission across computer networks of "any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image or other communi-
cation which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent, with
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person. "35 Sec-
ond, it bans the transmission across computer networks of any
comment, etc., that is obscene or indecent if the party transmit-
ting the information knows that the recipient is under the age of
eighteen. 6 Third, it prohibits transmission of any comment that
in context depicts or describes in terms patently offensive-as
measured by contemporary community standards-sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs in a manner that the communication is
available to people under the age of eighteen.37
These broad provisions imposing criminal liability are rife with
First Amendment concerns. It is not surprising that within min-
utes after being signed into law, a lawsuit was filed in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
challenging the constitutionality of the Act, particularly the "inde-
cency" and "patently offensive" provisions. The federal district
court granted a temporary restraining order against the "inde-
cency" portion of the statute, declaring that the word is a constitu-
tionally vague basis for judging one's future conduct.38 It will be
interesting to track that case as it proceeds through a three-judge
court for review 9 and, probably, to the Supreme Court.40 It may
33 See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995) (brokerage firm later withdrew its libel suit against on-line service provider
after it obtained an apology).
34 See, e.g., John Schwartz, With Innovative Use, the Web Empowers the First Amend-
ment, WASH. POST, July 15, 1996, at F19 (exploring extensive "hate speech" on Internet,
indexing mechanisms, and vocal on-line opponents).
35 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 502(a).
36 Id. at § 502(d).
37 Id.
38 ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL 65464 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996) (Buckwalter, J.).
39 Editorial Note: After Mr. Abrams' speech, injunctive relief against enforcement of the
Communications Decency Act was upheld by a three-judge panel. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F.
Supp. 824, 849, 856 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (declaring Communications Decency Act unconstitu-
tional in that it violated freedom of speech and failed to define adequately "indecent" and
"patently offensive"). The first portion of the opinion was devoted to describing the develop-
ment of Cyberspace and the Internet. Id. at 830-49. The judges actually went on-line them-
selves to assist in the writing of the opinion.
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be that the Supreme Court will ultimately have to address the
question of what "indecency" means and, whatever it means,
whether it is clear enough and predictable enough in its applica-
tion to be constitutional. 41
There have been prior cases involving indecency, such as the
Pacifica "seven dirty words" case 42 in radio and the Sable Commu-
nications case 43 with respect to telephones, but the Court has
never defined exactly what "indecency" means.4 It is also not at
all clear how the peculiar on-line environment will affect a review-
ing court's thinking. For example, there has been much commen-
tary about the Internet community being different from one's local
community, which is the current standard used to decide obscen-
ity cases. 45 Individuals in the privacy of their home communicat-
ing around the world with other people is the very nature of the
Internet. Therefore, the question of what the relevant community
is for judging indecency or even obscenity is not at all an easy one.
The Online Family Empowerment Act seems to raise questions
at least as difficult. This Act was adopted at the same time as the
Communications Decency Act and contains a number of findings
40 Editorial Note: Subsequent to Mr. Abrams' speech, the United States Supreme Court
has indeed granted review. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996) (noting probable
jurisdiction).
41 See Harvey Berkman, Medium is Message - Courts Say Congress Goofed in CDA
Focus on Smut, not the Internet, NATL L.J., Aug. 19, 1996, at Al (stating focus of Communi-
cations Decency Act is incorrect and focus should be on mode of communication rather than
content); see also Jared Sandberg, On-line: Federal Judges Block Censorship on the In-
ternet, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1996, at B1 (discussing implications of ACLU v. Reno
decision).
42 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978) (banning afternoon radio broad-
cast of comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" did not constitute censorship under Com-
munications Act of 1934).
43 Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (holding prohibition and
restriction of adult access to "dial-a-porn" unconstitutional and stating "the statute's denial
of adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that
which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages").
44 See Floyd Abrams, Prior Restraints, in COMMUNICATIONS LAw 1995, at 343 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 343, 1995) (outlin-
ing developing standards for assessing obscenity and indecency); see also Laurence H.
Winer, The Signal Cable Sends, Part II-Interference from the Indecency Cases, 55 FoR-
HAm L. REV. 459, 489 (1987) (discussing content control in broadcasting).
45 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974) (permitting jurors to draw on
personal beliefs when assessing obscenity); see also Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157
(1974) (individual states may establish geographical limits for assessing obscenity); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 18, 24 (1973) (requiring jury to apply local community standards in
obscenity case); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489-90 (1957) (explaining contempo-
rary community standards determine whether obscenity appeals to prurient interest). See
generally Monroe E. Price, The Market for Loyalties: Electronic Media and the Global Com-
petition for Allegiances, 104 YALE L.J. 667, 694-95 (1994) (discussing "localism" and First
Amendment in broadcasting).
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about the desirability of the Internet as an entity. Congress states
that it "offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, myriad avenues
for intellectual activity. The Internet and other interactive com-
puter services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans,
with a minimum of government regulation."46 After saying more
good things about the Internet, Congress did something very in-
teresting. Under the heading of "Protection for 'good samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material," it states, "[n]o pro-
vider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."47 A pre-emption section follows
this provision.
The most obvious purpose of this Act was to disapprove of and,
insofar as Congress is able, to overrule the approach followed by
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy.49 In Stratton, the court found Prod-
igy to be a publisher rather than an electronic billboard operator
because Prodigy was taking editorial care about what it was post-
ing and what it was not posting.50 The conference report specifi-
cally says that one of the bill's purposes is to "overrule Stratton
Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of con-
tent . . . ."51 The disavowal of the Stratton Oakmont case will no
doubt please the many commentators who have criticized the
opinion.52 Many of these same commentators, with many of whom
46 Online Empowerment Act § 509(a)(3) and (4).
47 Id. § 509(c).
48 Id. § 509(d)(1)-(4) (declaring statute will have no effect on criminal law, intellectual
property law, state law, or communications privacy law).
49 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., WL 323710, at *1, *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 24, 1995) (holding Prodigy was publisher rather than distributor because it used tech-
nology and manpower to delete offensive notes from bulletin board).
50 See id. at *4-*5.
51 S. REP. No. 230, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). The legislative history states:
[olne of the specific purposes of this section (referring to Section 509 - Online Family
Empowerment provisions) is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions which have treated providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable mate-
rial. The conferees believe that such decisions create serious obstacles to the impor-
tant federal policy of empowering parents to determine the content of communications
their children receive through interactive computer services.
Id.
52 See Iris Ferosie, Don't Shoot the Messenger: Protecting Free Speech on Editorially Con-
trolled Bulletin Board Services by Applying Sullivan Malice, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 347, 347 (1996) (applying Sullivan malice test to information service providers
exercising editorial control); see also Frederick B. Lim, Obscenity and Cyberspace: Commu-
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I am ideologically aligned as a general matter, praised the previ-
ous decision of Judge Leisure in the Southern District of New
York in a case called Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.." Cubby
held that CompuServe was more like a distributor, such as a li-
brary or a book store, than a publisher because it did not exercise
editorial control over what it transmitted. 4 Since CompuServe
was a distributor, the court held that the appropriate standard of
review for liability is whether it knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory statements. 55 This is the same standard set
forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts which says, "one who
only delivers or transmits defamatory matter published by a third
person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows or has reason
to know of its defamatory character."56
The removal of the Stratton Oakmont case, while certainly a re-
lief to on-line providers, by no means settles what I consider to be
the difficult questions in this area. I have both bad news and good
news in that regard. The bad news is, read fairly, the language
that has been repeated in opinions that are supposed to be speech
protective, such as Cubby, is not very protective at all. Everyone
was so busy trying to prove Stratton Oakmont wrong, that I think
not enough attention has been paid to the "know or reason to
know standard" for distributors.
Of course, the common understanding is that on-line services,
due to the sheer volume of messages crossing their computer lines
each day, can never "know" of the content. That was the rationale
of the Cubby case where the Court stated in glowing language:
"CompuServe has no [more] editorial control over such a pub-
lication than does a public library, book store, or newsstand,
and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine
every publication it carries for potentially defamatory state-
ments than it would be for any other distributor to do so."5 7
nity Standards in an On-Line World, 20 COLUM.-VIA J.L. & ARTS 291, 311-12 (1996) (ex-
plaining inconsistent results under Stratton Oakmont); David P. Miranda, Defamation in
Cyberspace: Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Co., 5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 229, 235
(1996) (discussing adverse ramifications of Stratton Oakmont).
53 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Leisure, J.).
54 Id. at 140.
55 Id. at 140-41.
56 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 581 (1976).
57 Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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But what is meant by "reason to know?" Is this a negligence
standard underprotective of on-line providers and their First
Amendment rights? It sure sounds a lot less protective than New
York Times v. Sullivan,5 8 which is the opposite of "reason to know"
and applies a standard of actual knowledge or actual serious
doubts as to truth or falsity.
59
What would happen if an on-line service was given notice that it
was going to carry a defamatory message or that some named au-
thor was going to submit something which is defamatory? Sup-
pose the warning came from a reliable source. Would the on-line
provider be on some notice, some duty to investigate and face lia-
bility if it did not? Or even worse, what happens after something
has been carried and a letter comes in to an on-line service claim-
ing it is defamatory, and it remains there. Is the provider obliged
to investigate and make a judgment as to truth or falsity? We
know on-line services have absolutely no facilities to make judg-
ments as to truth or falsity at all; that is not what they exist to do.
To impose that sort of responsibility under defamation law, there-
fore, would so drastically change the way these companies do busi-
ness that it could imperil their businesses.
It seems to me that a far more protective standard is needed
than "reason to know;" something like "knowing," more like "ac-
tual knowledge." It does not now exist as a matter of common law.
Where it does exist, interestingly enough, is in the Online Family
Empowerment statute. 60 Congress has said that on-line providers
not only are not publishers, but are not speakers at all.6 ' If they
are not speakers, then they should not be liable under any theory.
The Congress has provided absolute immunity against libel with a
pre-emption section, making it impossible for the state courts,
under state law, to impose liability.62 This is a plain reading of the
58 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding actual malice necessary element in defamation action by
public official against newspaper).
59 Id. at 279-80.
60 Cf. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139 (noting requirement that distributors have actual
knowledge of content before incurring responsibility "is deeply rooted in the First
Amendment").
61 Online Family Empowerment Act § 509(c)(1). According to this section, "[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider." Id.
62 Id. § 509(d)(3). According to this section, '[no cause of action may be brought and no
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section."
Id.
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statute, if not necessarily its primary statutory purpose. It will be
a topic of very interesting litigation yet to come.
Let me conclude with a final thought. I have spent a lot of time
representing journalists, 63 newspapers,64 and magazines. 65 Some-
times when I give them lectures, I tell them that I think the devel-
opment of law will be impacted enormously by the level of respon-
sibility that they show in the way they behave-by their
journalism itself. I have sometimes thought that if publications
behave like Australian and English publications we will wind up
with Australian or English law someday, if we are not careful.
That is not a speech I can give with respect to the Internet. The
Internet is not something about which one can give little lectures
to small groups of journalists asking them to be responsible and
do a good job so that I or all the other lawyers in the country who
do what I do, can go before judges and say, "Look, trust us. You
know what we do is generally good. It is usually worthy. It is
better to leave us alone. It will be all right." That is not Internet
language at all. You cannot even use the language of "responsibil-
ity" in this context.
63 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 155 (1979) (action against CBS producer Lando
and narrator Mike Wallace for broadcasting report on accusations of retired army officer
concerning Vietnam War atrocities); see also Newton v. National Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662,
665-66 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 866 (1991) (litigation concerning NBC broad-
cast of "Wayne Newton and the Law" concerning Las Vegas organized crime); Smith v.
Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981) (action by
New York Times reporter against telephone utility alleging unconstitutional wiretapping
and electronic surveillance); Dowd v. Calabese, 589 F. Supp. 1206, 1209 (D.C. 1984) (de-
fending Wall Street Journal, its publisher and reporter in libel action by members of San
Francisco Strike Force).
64 See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 694 (1988) (proceeding to
enjoin FBI, newspaper, and television station from revealing information obtained as re-
sult of illegal electronic surveillance); see also Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 382
(9th Cir. 1988) (litigation brought by Secretary of State against NBC, New York Times, and
The Daily Herald to prohibit exit polling in area of polling places on election day); Edwards
v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002
(1977) (libel action against New York Times for critical reports concerning National Audu-
bon Society and use of insecticides); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394,
1395 (D.C. 1973) (motion to quash deposition subpoenas of Committee for Reelection of
President to reporters affiliated with New York Times, Time Magazine, and Washington
Post concerning Watergate break-in photographs, tapes, notes, etc.); Gross v. New York
Times Co., 632 N.E.2d 1163 (1993) (defamation action brought by former Chief Medical
Examiner of New York City against New York Times for publishing allegations of profes-
sional misconduct).
65 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 541 (1985) (copy-
right infringement action against The Nation for publishing excerpts of unpublished manu-
script by President Gerald Ford); see also Bressler v. Fortune Magazine, 971 F.2d 1226,
1227 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993) (defamation action against Fortune
Magazine); Church of Scientology Intl v. Time Warner, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 637, 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (defamation claim against Time Magazine and its publisher).
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It is true that an on-line service can make what decisions it
wants about what to carry. What decisions it should reach are
sometimes difficult. The nature of the Internet, it seems to me,
fits closely with what Justice Brennan was talking about in New
York Times v. Sullivan: robust, wide open, and uninhibited.66
That is what the Internet is and what it has to be, because there is
no way to impose standards of responsibility akin to those of jour-
nalism that I occasionally preach to some of my clients.
The medium itself, it seems to me, is one which really tests our
faith in the First Amendment. The medium gives technological
tools for people to communicate more effectively, more directly,
more widely. It is quite different from the traditional forms of me-
dia which are increasingly run by fewer and fewer entities. While
the cost of Internet access remains prohibitive to some members of
the community, there is every reason to think that the cost will go
down in the future.6 7
The question, I think, is this: How will the public, the courts,
and the Congress determine whether the Internet offers too much
First Amendment freedom? Is it all too much of a good thing? Is
it too vigorous a marketplace of ideas? Is it, as some in Congress
seem to think, too safe a haven for potentially dangerous individu-
als intent on spreading hate speech and pornography?
Those of us who speak the First Amendment language should
not ignore the reality that the Internet has become a better home
for people who engage in hate speech and spread pornography
than any other means of communication we have ever had. 8 I
66 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brennan, J.) (asserting
.profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open....").
67 See Internet Access: Cisco Enables netware users to connect easily to the Internet; hard-
ware/software solutions reduce cost & complexity for 50 million netware users, EDGE WORK-
GRoup COMPUTIG REP., May 6, 1996 (introducing new methods in Internet programs offer-
ing services at lower prices); see also Wayne Madsen, Securing Access and Privacy on the
Internet, COMPUTER FRAuD & SEC. BuLL., Jan. 1, 1996 (discussing pricing aspects of in-
ternet access); cf Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Thomas R. Lansner Senior
Consultant of Freedom House) (discussing international impact of and need for access to
information through Internet).
68 See Jason Kay, Sexuality, Live Without a Net: Regulating Obscenity and Indecency on
the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTER DSCiLINARY L.J. 355, 362 (1995) (discussing fear of
Internet becoming haven for hate speech and pornography due to low-cost capacity to reach
broad audience); see also The Web of Hate: Extremists Exploit the Internet, ANTI-DEFAMA-
TION LEAGUE REPORT ON ANTISEMITIsM ON LI-E, Jan. 1996; Group Seeks to Muzzle
Cyberhate; Internet: Censorship debate flares as Wiesenthal Center asks providers to deny
access to those who denigrate minorities, L.A. TsS, Jan. 11, 1996, at 1 (detailing ongoing
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could read you long quotes from skinheads praising the Internet.
They have never had a better way to communicate. Those of us
who walk the First Amendment line ought not to deny the truth of
this reality.
What the Internet does is make us decide at the end of the day
how much we really believe in the idea that, on balance, it is a
good idea to have more speech rather than less, even if the speech
is sometimes awful, and maybe even if the speech is sometimes
dangerous. It is not surprising that some fringe speakers have
been some of the first to use and exploit the new technology. It
seems to me that supporters of freedom of cyberspeech are going
to have to do a lot more to convince the public that far more is to
be gained by allowing freedom of expression of the broadest sort to
flourish on the Internet, even unsavory speech, then to attempt to
censor it.
In that respect, I sort of like my own current vantage point as a
First Amendment practitioner looking at this strange new me-
dium from the outside. One of these days soon, maybe before I see
any of you again, I promise to take my maiden voyage on the 'Net.
Next time I come back, I will not have the purity of vision that
only comes from having so little idea about the technology of the
medium of which I have been talking. But I will still remember
the words of the First Amendment.
debate concerning use of online services to spread hate speech and pornography); Serge F.
Kovaleski, Universities Vexed by Use of Their Internet Connections for Hate Mail, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 4, 1995, at A4 (exploring anonymity and rampant hate speech on Internet);
Kelly Owen, Oklahoma City: After the Bombing Hate Speech on Internet Called Protected by
Constitution, L.A. TudEs, May 12, 1995, at 17 (debating whether increased violence re-
quires stricter regulations for computer network access).
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